tiscalinet.it email servers, SPF and DMARC

tiscalinet.it publishes 5 MX hosts; senders try the lowest priority number first (etb-1.mail.tiscali.it, 10) and fall back to the others in order.

1 other domain we checked on the same day also route mail to hosts under tiscali.it, with different records from tiscalinet.it: katamail.com.

The record on 5 November 2026 was v=spf1 include:smtp.tiscali.it -all.

In plain terms, it delegates to smtp.tiscali.it. The top level uses 1 DNS-querying term; SPF allows 10 in total including nested includes (RFC 7208 §4.6.4).

It ends in a hard fail (-all): receivers may reject mail from any server the record does not list.

_dmarc.tiscalinet.it returned no DMARC record on 5 November 2026. Receivers therefore get no instruction about mail that fails SPF and DKIM, which makes @tiscalinet.it easier to spoof (RFC 7489).

tiscalinet.it shares etb-1.mail.tiscali.it, etb-2.mail.tiscali.it and etb-3.mail.tiscali.it with tiscali.it. When we tested those servers for tiscali.it on 13 October 2026, the result was: Hard to verify. The server refuses connections it does not trust before answering about the mailbox.

Our checker treats @tiscalinet.it like any domain: syntax, MX, disposable and role checks first, then a made-up address to rule out a catch-all, then your address at RCPT TO, disconnecting without sending. We have not tested @tiscalinet.it itself, but its mail goes to the same servers as tiscali.it, so expect @tiscalinet.it results to follow the pattern described there. Each result carries its own reason.

DNS tells you where mail goes, not whether one person's mailbox still exists. For a list, run the whole file through a verifier before you send: invalid rows come out, risky rows (catch-all, unknown, refused) go in their own segment, and valid rows are safe to mail.